

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

RESTRICTED
 (Reclassify when
 filled out)
 CONFIDENTIAL

(OMIT THIS SHEET IF NO ATTACK WAS MADE)

X. ATTACK ON ENEMY SHIPS OR GROUND OBJECTIVES (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only),

Bivouac Area, Target areas 512 and 513

(a) Location of Target(s) Guam Island, Marianas Islands. (b) Time Over Target(s) 0905 K-10 GCT

(c) Weather and Clouds Over Target 2000' Cumulus, 5/10

(d) Sun or Moon Clear beneath clouds. (e) Visibility 15-20 Miles.

XI. TARGETS, RESULTS OF ATTACK.

(a) DESCRIPTION OF TARGET (List All Ships in Group, Whether or Not Individually Attacked)	(b) A/C ATTACKING	(d) BOMBS AND AMMUNITION EXPENDED, EACH TARGET	(e) ALTITUDE OF RELEASE	(f) HITS
	(c) SQUADRON			
1 <u>Bivouac Area.</u>	<u>4x TBM-1c</u> <u>VT-60</u>	<u>13x350# Depth Bombs</u>		<u>13</u>
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				

(g) RESULTS: (FOR SHIP TARGETS DRAW DIAGRAM, TOP OR SIDE VIEW OR BOTH, AS APPROPRIATE, SHOWING TYPE AND LOCATION OF HITS. FOR ALL TARGETS GIVE LOCATION AND EFFECT OF HITS, WITH DIAGRAMS OR CHARTS WHERE DESIRABLE. DESCRIBE TARGETS FULLY IN (a), AND IN REPORTING DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION, IDENTIFY BY NUMBERS AT LEFT. USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS IF NECESSARY).

1. These four TBM's were carrying depth bombs as they had just been relieved from Anti Submarine Patrol. Thirteen bombs were dropped in the areas assigned and three failed to release from one plane. The area was well covered by these bombs, but the immediate results were not observed.

(h) Were Photographs Taken? no. Photographs of Damage, When Taken, Should Be Attached.

CONFIDENTIAL

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

Report No. VF-60 11-44

1. No enemy aircraft were seen in the air.
2. There was no AA fire observed.

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AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

Report No. VT-60 11-44

1. All planes functioned in a normal manner with the exception of one in which the bomb release mechanism failed to function properly. When later checked on deck, all bombs dropped readily and the only explanation that the gunnery officer could venture was that the pilot was in too steep a dive when he released his bombs.

REPORT PREPARED BY:

APPROVED BY:

H.E. Richmond, Lieut. USNR, ACIO, VT-60 W.C. Vincent, Lt.Cdr. USNR, CO VT-60
27 July, 1944.

2701

ALB-3

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
CARRIER DIVISION TWENTY TWO

(cm)

Serial 0224

CONFIDENTIAL

c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
18 August, 1944.



FIRST MEMORANDUM to:
CO BUREAU Conf Ltr.,
ALB-3(1) (10-gjh) Serial -
022 dated 17 August, 1944.

From: Commander Carrier Division TWENTY TWO.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via : (1) Commander Task Force 58.
(2) Commander Fifth Fleet.
(3) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

AUG 25 1944 AM

Subject: Aircraft Action Reports.
1. Forwarded.

T. L. SPRAGUE,

Copy to:
ComairPac ✓
CO BUREAU.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET

SECRET

JML/wjd

S-E-C-R-E-T

30 August 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: BRIEF of Aircraft Action Reports, Air Group SIXTY,
13-31 July 1944. R/S 014456.

1. During this period, Air Group 60 (Lt. Comdr. H.O. Feilback, USNR, AGC.) conducted operations from USS SUWANNEE in support of ground attack forces.

2. On 22 July four VF and four VT of A.G. 60 joined four VF of VF-37 (SANGAMON) and four VF of VF-35 (CHENANGO) in a glide-bombing attack on enemy troop positions on Guam. All planes were sent to the target area together, as a strike group, with about a three-hour endurance. After circling for one and three quarters hours, four VF were assigned a bombing target. No air coordinator was present to assist in locating the target. Twenty to thirty minutes were therefore spent in locating what was assumed to be the target, but no direct hits were realized. The second group of four VF were then directed to attack the same target. Time was getting short, and this group was hurried. They took about twenty minutes, however, to locate what they assumed to be the target.

The fact that the bombs dropped by these two groups, supposedly on the same target, struck areas that were two to three miles apart, makes it evident that the target charts are too difficult to interpret or that an air coordinator is essential.

Meanwhile, but also comparatively late, the four VT were directed to work with front line troops. Although they, too, were unnecessarily rushed, their bombing could be guided by ground forces and the results were satisfactory.

In view of the above sequence of events, which is not an isolated case, the following suggestions are submitted:

(a) No more planes than can be profitably used should be ordered to the target area. In general, if large numbers are required, fewer planes sent oftener are recommended. It is probable that half as many VT could have done more actual damage in this instance.

(b) A flight leader should not be expected to act also as Air Coordinator when more than two divisions are in the flight.

(c) An Air Coordinator or observer who has been on station long enough to orient himself should be present to assist strike groups in locating pin-point targets.

(d) If no prominent target is evident, strike leaders should be assigned to a general area as soon as they arrive, to spot actual enemy activity. This is more effective than standing by out of visibility range and then attempting to hit a pin-point target that the support air coordinator surmises is at a certain point on the chart. This especially holds true when there is no air coordinator.

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
 AIR FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET

30 August 1944

Subject: BRIEF of Aircraft Action Reports, Air Group SIXTY, 13-31 July
 1944. R/S 014456.

3. On 26 June, five VF of VF-60, with six VF of VF-37, undertook a glide-bombing and strafing mission over Guam. AGC: "On this particular mission the flight leader, who was also air coordinator, carried a bomb rack loaded with six miniature practice smoke bombs, with which he planned to drop on the target to outline it to other planes. This was done and it worked out very well in that the pilots following him in could see exactly where the bombs were to be placed. This system has a number of advantages, the most important of which are (1) There is no waste of heavy bombs in the event that the coordinator should miss the target on his first pass. (2) By using miniature bombs, there is no danger of the coordinator dropping a high explosive bomb within our own lines on close support missions. (3) The smoke from the miniature bombs can be seen by all pilots whereas not all pilots can see tracers used to indicate a target. (4) There always seems to be some confusion when a target is located by radio or by having the coordinator make passes or dry runs and the miniature bomb will definitely mark the spot to be bombed. (5) The ground or Air Liaison parties can watch where the miniature bombs hit and direct the Air Coordinator to the exact spot they wish to be bombed."

Of a similar mission a few days later, the AGC remarks: "On this mission the benefit of the use of miniature smoke bombs has again proven itself. The air coordinator was led to the area to be bombed by the Air Liaison Party at which point the A.C. dropped a miniature bomb. The A.L.P., using this as a reference point, then proceeded to direct the Air Coordinator to the exact spot to be bombed at which point the A.C. dropped two more miniatures. The A.L.P. radioed that the spot was 'perfect' and all planes proceeded to drop their bombs at that point".

Briefed by Operational Information Section.

D.B. Steimle
 D.B. STEIMLE,
 Lieut., USNR, Acting.

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